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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH:
SUPREME COURT STRIKES DOWN TWO PROVISIONS
OF THE CHILD PORNOGRAPHY PREVENTION ACT (CPPA),
LEAVING VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
VIRTUALLY UNREGULATED
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002)*
I. FACTS
Congress enacted the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996
(CPPA)I in response to advances in technology that allowed the creation
of computer images of what appear to be minors engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.2 Actual children are not harmed in the production of these
computer-generated images, but the depictions are practically
indistinguishable from those in which real children are sexually abused.3
* Winner of a North Dakota State Bar Foundation Outstanding Note/Comment Award.
1. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (2000).
2. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 7 (1996).
3. Id. at 2. Congress noted the realistic images created by computer animation in movies
such as Jurassic Park, Twister, and Independence Day. Id. at 15. Furthermore, Congress relied
on the testimony of Deputy Assistant Attorney General Di Gregory, who stated that pedophiles
have altered and created images for many years, but in the past, the images were rudimentary
magazine cutouts or assembled collages that were re-photographed. Id. These images could
either be quickly identified as false, or a careful inspection would prove they were not actual
pictures. Id.
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Di Gregory further noted that the ability of detectives to
easily reveal the images as false may no longer be possible because of image-altering software and
computer hardware. Id. Computers allow for the creation of images that appear to be real chil-
dren engaging in sexual activity. Id. He stated it would soon be possible to produce child
pornography without actually molesting children, and these images could be used to foster actual
abuse. Id. Finally, he noted that the computers and software used to create these images are
inexpensive and readily available. Id.
Graphics specialists at the United States Postal Inspection Service supported the fact that the
tools to produce child pornography are inexpensive and readily available. Id. at 15-16. The only
equipment needed to create child pornography is a computer, images of children, and image-
editing software that can cost as little as fifty dollars. Id. at 16-17. According to the Inspection
Service, the images needed to create child pornography can be loaded onto a computer in several
ways:
[E]xisting images can be loaded onto the computer from a disk or CD; images taken
by a digital camera can be loaded from a disk; a scanner can be used to load photo-
graphs, book and magazines pictures, etc.; a video card, either internal or in an exter-
nal device, can capture and load frames from video tapes or directly from a television;
or a modem can download images from the Internet or other online computer service.
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Congress made a number of findings regarding the effects of child
pornography. 4 It determined that pedophiles often use child pornography as
a method to seduce reluctant children into participating in the production of
child pornography. 5 It also determined that pedophiles and child sexual
abusers use child pornography to "stimulate and whet their own sexual
appetites." 6
Furthermore, Congress found that images created wholly by electronic
means had the same effect as images created with actual children on pedo-
philes who used that material to rouse their own sexual appetites.7 The
level of danger to children who are persuaded to participate in child por-
nography was determined to be the same regardless of whether the pictures
used to seduce the children are of actual children, or computer-generated
images created without the use of children. 8 Congress determined that this
sexualization of minors creates an unhealthy environment for children be-
cause it encourages society to perceive children as sexual objects, and
further perpetuates their abuse and exploitation. 9 Based on these findings,
Congress concluded that this sexualization of minors affects the "psycho-
logical, mental and emotional development of children and undermines the
efforts of parents and families to encourage the sound mental, moral and
emotional development of children."10
After the CPPA was enacted, the Free Speech Coalition filed a pre-
enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of specific provisions of the
Act." The Free Speech Coalition is a California trade association of busi-
4. Id. at 2-7.
5. Id. at 2. Congress found that child pornography is frequently used to seduce children into
sexual activity. Id. "[A] child who is reluctant to engage in sexual activity with an adult, or to
pose for sexually explicit photographs, can sometimes be convinced by viewing depictions of
other children 'having fun' participating in such activity." Id. Congress noted findings by Dr.
O'Brien, a prominent author in child pornography. Id. at 14.
[T]he "cycle" of child pornography: (1) child pornographic material is shown to a
child for "educational purposes"; (2) an attempt is made to convince a child that
explicit sex is acceptable, even desirable; (3) the child is convinced that other children
are sexually active and that such conduct is okay; (4) child pornography desensitizes
the child, lowering the child's inhibitions; (5) some of these sessions progress to
sexual activity involving the child; (6) photographs or films are taken of the sexual
activity; and (7) this new child pornographic material is used to attract and seduce yet
more child victims.
Id.





11. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 25 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2305; No. 97-0281SC, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212, at *1-*2 (N.D. Cal. August 12, 1997).
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nesses involved in the production and distribution of non-obscene adult-
oriented materials.12 Other plaintiffs involved in the suit were individual
publishers, artists, and photographers whose works consisted of nude and
erotic images. 13
The Free Speech Coalition filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California.14 The Coalition alleged that certain
provisions of the CPPA unconstitutionally violated its First Amendment
rights.15 The plaintiffs contended that their works did not involve material
that would be regulated by the CPPA, but that for fear of prosecution, they
had discontinued production, distribution, and possession of certain
materials.16 Both parties filed motions for summary judgment.17
The district court granted the government's motion for summary
judgment and upheld the constitutionality of the provisions.18 The Free
Speech Coalition appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit,' 9 which reversed the district court and found the CPPA
provisions unconstitutional. 20 Specifically, the court found the language
"appears to be"21 a minor, and "convey[s] the impression" 22 of a minor to
12. Brief for Respondents at 8 n.7, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002)
(No. 00-795). For more information about the Free Speech Coalition see http://www.
freespeechcoalition.com/home.htm.
13. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212, at *1. Plaintiffs were "Bold Type,
Inc., the publisher of a book advocating the nudist lifestyle; Jim Gingerich, a painter of nudes; and
Ron Raffaelli, a photographer specializing in erotic images." Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,
122 S. Ct. 1389, 1398 (2002).
14. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212, at *1.
15. Id. at *2. The relevant provision at issue was 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (2000), which defines
child pornography as:
[Any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, or computer or
computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic,
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct;
(B) such visual depiction is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct;
(C) such visual depiction has been created, adapted, or modified to appear
that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or
(D) such visual depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or
contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct ...
18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(A)-(D) (2000).
16. Free Speech Coalition, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12212, at *7.
17. Id. at *2.
18. Id. at *23.
19. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 1999).
20. Id. at 1097.
21. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
22. Id. § 2256(8)(D).
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be overbroad and unconstitutional. 23 The court found that the CPPA was
constitutional when the two provisions were stricken from it.24
The court of appeals further found that the CPPA regulated speech
based on its content.25 Therefore, the government needed to establish a
compelling interest and show that the CPPA was narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest. 26 The court relied on New York v. Ferber,27 in which
the Supreme Court found the government's compelling interest was
protecting children from the harmful effects child pornography had on the
actual children involved in the production of pornographic materials. 28 The
court of appeals found that the government was unable to prove a link
existed between virtual child pornography and harm to actual children.29
Accordingly, the court of appeals determined that the government lacked
the compelling interest necessary to justify criminalizing virtual child
pornography. 30
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the
prohibitions of §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) of the Child Pornography
Prevention Act were overbroad and unconstitutional. 3' The Court reasoned
that the provisions prohibited a substantial amount of lawful speech without
a justification supported by First Amendment law. 32
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech." 33 However,
the Supreme Court has recognized that freedom of speech has its limits and
specific types of speech are outside the realm of constitutionally protected
speech. 34 The categories of speech that fall outside First Amendment
23. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1086.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1091.
26. Id.
27. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
28. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1092 (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757).
29. Id. at 1094.
30. Id. at 1095.
31. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1406 (2002); 18 U.S.C. §
2256(8)(B), (D) (2000).
32. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1405.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding obscenity is outside the
realm of constitutionally protected speech).
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention
and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional
problem .... It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
[VOL. 79:175
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protection include incitement, defamation, obscenity, and child
pornography produced with actual children.35 An overview of First
Amendment jurisprudence is helpful in order to gain a more complete




In order to allow the First Amendment the maximum amount of breath-
ing space, and to ensure that statutes are narrowly construed to regulate the
smallest amount of speech, a person may challenge a statute for con-
stitutional overbreadth. 37 The overbreadth doctrine is designed to limit
government infringement on First Amendment rights to only prohibit non-
protected speech such as obscenity, defamation, and incitement. 38 The
doctrine allows people to challenge a statute's constitutionality even when
it does not violate their freedom of expression. 39 A challenger must merely
prove that the statute violates the First Amendment rights of someone.40
This is a deviation from the normal constitutional standing requirements
that require litigants to prove their First Amendment rights have been
violated.41 The danger of an overly broad statute is that it is apt to create a
chilling effect on speech, whereby people may refrain from constitutionally
protected speech because they fear prosecution. 42
Before a statute will be invalidated, a court must find that it prohibits a
substantial amount of protected speech as compared to its legitimate appli-
cation.4 3 For example, the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance as
substantially overbroad in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.44 In R.A.V., the peti-
tioner was charged with violating a bias-motivated crime ordinance for
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 n.2, n.4 (1942).
35. E.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105,
127 (1991).
36. 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
37. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-12 (1973).
38. See id. at 612-13 (explaining the overbreadth doctrine); Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S.
at 127 (listing unprotected categories of speech).
39. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
40. Id.
41. Id. Constitutional standing normally requires that the plaintiff has suffered an "injury in
fact"; that there be a "causal connection" between the conduct complained of and the suffered
injury; and that it is likely that a favorable decision will redress the injury. Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 167 (1997).
42. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
43. Id. at 615.
44. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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burning a cross on the front lawn of an African-American family.45 The
petitioner challenged the ordinance as overbroad because it not only crimi-
nalized unprotected speech, but it also criminalized a large portion of pro-
tected speech under the First Amendment.46 The ordinance prohibited
displaying a symbol that "arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." 47 The Court found that
the ordinance was unconstitutional because although it criminalized consti-
tutionally unprotected speech, it also reached a substantial amount of
constitutionally protected expressions.48
Justice White's concurrence noted that a law that criminalizes a sub-
stantial amount of protected speech is facially invalid even if it has lawful
applications.4 9 Justice White stated that the ordinance criminalized conduct
that "causes only hurt feelings, offense, or resentment and is protected by
the First Amendment." 50 Therefore, the ordinance was "fatally overbroad"
and unconstitutional on its face.5 1 Before the Court could correctly apply
the doctrine of overbreadth, it first had to identify areas of speech that fell
outside the protection of the Constitution.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONALLY UNPROTECTED
OBSCENITY
Prior to the adoption of child pornography as an unprotected category
of speech, the Supreme Court applied obscenity guidelines to determine
whether speech such as this was protected.52 In Roth v. United States, 53 the
Court first held that obscenity was outside the realm of constitutionally pro-
tected speech.54 The Court stated that the test for a finding of obscenity was
"whether to the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to pruri-
ent interest." 55 The Court defined prurient material as material that has a
45. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 379-80.
46. Id. at 380.
47. Id. (citing ST. PAUL, MiNN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
48. Id. at 391. At the end of the opinion, the majority added the following statement: "Let
there be no mistake about our belief that burning a cross in someone's front yard is reprehensible.
But St. Paul has sufficient means at its disposal to prevent such behavior without adding the First
Amendment to the fire." Id. at 396.
49. Id. at 414 (White, J., concurring).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
53. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
54. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485.
55. Id. at 489.
[VOL. 79:175
CASE COMMENT
tendency to "excite lustful thoughts."56 Because the Court in Roth did not
have reason to consider whether the material at issue was obscene, the
definition remained unclear. 57
1. The Court's Struggle to Define Obscenity
The Supreme Court continued to struggle with creating a concrete defi-
nition of obscenity.58 In Jacobellis v. Ohio,59 the Court reversed a judg-
ment against Jacobellis for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film in a
movie theater. 60 Revealing the Court's frustration at attempting to define
what qualified as obscenity, Justice Stewart wrote in his concurrence, "I
know it when I see it."61
The frustration continued as a majority of the Court was unable to
agree on a single test for obscenity. 62 In A Book Named "John Cleland's
Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts,63
the Court reversed a ruling that held John Cleland's book, written in 1750,
was obscene. 64 A plurality of the Court revised the Roth test to include
three elements that must be satisfied before a finding of obscenity was
proper.65 The test required a finding of the following three elements: the
theme of the whole work must appeal to a prurient interest; the work must
be patently offensive because of an affront to contemporary community
standards; and the material must be "utterly without redeeming social
value."66
2. A Common Definition of Obscenity
After sixteen years of confusion, a majority of the Court was finally
able to agree on a definition of obscenity.67 In Miller v. California,68 the
56. Id. at 486. The Court defined prurient as "[iltching; longing; uneasy with desire or
longing; of persons, having itching, morbid or lascivious longings; of desire, curiosity, or
propensity, lewd." Id. at 487 n.20 (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(unabridged, 2d ed., 1949)).
57. See id. The Court did not consider whether the material was obscene because the
challenge was to a federal statute barring the mailing of such material. Id. at 493.
58. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194-95 (1964).
59. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
60. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 186-87.
61. Id. at 197 (Stewart, J., concurring).
62. See A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y Gen. of
Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 414 (1966) (the majority opinion was comprised of three Justices).
63. 383 U.S. 413 ('1966).
64. John Cleland's Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 417.
65. Id. at 418 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
66. Id.
67. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
20031
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Court faced the challenge of creating a common definition of obscenity that
would put an end to the confusion resulting from the standards created in
earlier cases. 69 Miller was convicted of knowingly distributing obscene
material, a misdemeanor under California law, after he had sent out a mass
mailing of adult material. 70 Miller's conviction arose specifically because
he sent five unsolicited brochures to a business in Newport Beach,
California. 71 The manager of the business and his mother opened the enve-
lope, which contained the unsolicited adult material. 72 They complained to
the police because they had not requested the material.73
The Court noted that the states have a legitimate interest in prohibiting
the distribution of obscene material when the method of distribution creates
a significant danger of offending unwilling recipients. 74 The challenge in
Miller was defining a standard to identify what was obscene material that a
state could regulate without violating the protections of the First
Amendment.7 5
The Miller Court developed a test that combined the Court's past
rulings on obscenity and set out the following basic guidelines:
(a) whether 'the average person applying contemporary communi-
ty standards' would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest; ... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.76
The Miller test gave the states a concrete definition of obscenity. 77
However, it did not offer any more protection to children from obscenity
and pornography than previous decisions.78
68. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
69. Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
70. Id. at 16-18.
71. Id. at 17-18.
72. Id. at 18.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 18-19.
75. Id. at 19-20. For sixteen years before the Court decided Miller, it was not able to agree
on a standard to determine what constituted obscene material outside the protection of the First
Amendment. Id. at 29.
76. Id. at 24. The Miller Court recognized that developing a uniform national standard of
what "appeals to the prurient interest" or is "patently offensive" would be an "exercise in futility."
Id. at 30. The Court stated that the determination of what constitutes "contemporary community
standards" is better left to the trier of fact. Id.
77. Id. at 24.
78. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968) (ruling New York could regulate
pornographic material given to children). Ginsberg was convicted of selling "girlie" magazines to
a sixteen-year-old boy in violation of a New York criminal statute. Id. at 631. Although the
[VOL. 79:175
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C. CREATING A CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
The Supreme Court extended the states' ability to protect children from
pornography and its harmful effects in New York v. Ferber.79 Ferber was
the Court's first assessment of a statute directed at prohibiting sexual depic-
tions of children.80 The Miller standard did not apply because the New
York statute did not require that the prohibited material be legally ob-
scene. 81 Therefore, the Ferber Court created a new category of unprotected
speech and unanimously ruled that child pornography was not protected by
the First Amendment. 82
The case arose when Ferber, who owned a bookstore specializing in
sexually oriented materials, sold two films to undercover police officers.
83
The films contained images of children engaged in sexual activity. 84 Ferber
was convicted under a New York statute that criminalized the promotion
and distribution of materials depicting sexual performances of children
under the age of sixteen. 85
Ferber argued that the materials prohibited must be legally obscene
under the Miller test. 86 However, the Court ruled that the Miller test did not
accurately represent the more compelling interest a state has in protecting
the health and well-being of its youth.87 The Court further reasoned that the
Miller test was not connected to whether a child had been harmed in the
material's production. 88
The Ferber Court created a new test for child pornography that did not
require a finding of legal obscenity. 89 The Court determined that the states
were allowed greater leeway to regulate materials that sexually exploited
magazine would not have been considered obscene if sold to an adult, the statute prohibited the
stocking and selling of the magazines to people younger than seventeen. Id. at 634-35. The Court
reasoned that because of the state's interest in the well-being of its children, it could regulate the
distribution of pornographic material to juveniles even though it could not regulate it as to adults.
Id. at 640-43.
79. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982).
80. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 753.
81. Id. at 749-50; Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
82. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
83. Id. at 751-52.
84. Id. at 752.
85. Id. at 749.
86. Id. at 760; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
87. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
88. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761. The Court stated that a child could be sexually exploited and
harmed regardless of whether the depiction satisfied the "patently offensive" requirement of
Miller. Id. Furthermore, it was irrelevant to an abused child whether the material as a whole
contained serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id.; Miller, 413 U.S. at 23.
89. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764.
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and abused children.90 The Ferber Court used the guidelines developed for
regulating obscenity in Miller, but changed them as follows to more
accurately identify and regulate child pornography: "A trier of fact need
not find that the material appeals to the prurient interest of the average
person; it is not required that sexual conduct portrayed be done so in a
patently offensive manner; and the material at issue need not be considered
as a whole." 91 The test developed in Ferber was used only for the
regulation of child pornography; it did not change the obscenity standard
that the Court previously developed in Miller.92
The Ferber Court set out five justifications for its departure from
Miller.93 First, the Court found that a state's interest in protecting the
physical and psychological health of a minor is so compelling that a further
elaboration was unnecessary. 94  Second, the distribution of materials
portraying sexual activity involving children is fundamentally related to the
sexual abuse of children. 95 Third, marketing and selling child pornography
provides an economic incentive to continue producing such materials. 96
Fourth, little or no value exists in the performances and reproductions of
children engaged in sexual activity.97 Fifth, creating a new category of
unprotected speech is compatible with the Court's earlier decisions that
allowed content-based classifications of speech when the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests that a case-
by-case adjudication is unnecessary. 98
The Ferber analysis focused on the harm done to actual children used
in the production of child pornography. 99 The Court reasoned that the
materials produced created a permanent record of a child's sexual abuse and
that this harm was exacerbated by their continued circulation.OO Further-
more, in order to control the production of materials that sexually exploit
children, the network used to distribute the materials must be stopped. 10
90. Id. at 757-58.
91. Id. at 764-65; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
92. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
93. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756-63.
94. Id. at 756-57.
95. Id. at 759.
96. Id. at 761.
97. Id. at 762.
98. Id. at 763-64 (citing Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976)) (stating
that whether speech is protected by the First Amendment frequently depends on the content of the
speech).
99. See id. at 759 (referring to the sexual abuse of the children photographed during the





Ferber also argued that the New York statute was unconstitutionally
overbroad because it prohibited material with serious literary, scientific, or
educational value.102 The First Amendment overbreadth doctrine allows
people, such as Ferber, to attack overly broad statutes even though their
conduct is not constitutionally protected. 03 The doctrine is based on the
potential chilling effect that may result if people refrain from constitu-
tionally protected expression for fear of criminal punishment.104 However,
a statute is not invalid on its face simply because it is possible that a single
impermissible application may occur. 105
While application of the overbreadth doctrine was possible, the Court
stated that the statute in question must be substantially overbroad before it
will be invalidated on its face. 106 When conduct, as opposed to pure
speech, is involved, a finding of substantial overbreadth is especially
important. 07 Furthermore, the Court acknowledged that the penalty im-
posed, whether civil or criminal, is relevant in determining whether a statute
is substantially overbroad.108
The Ferber Court found the New York statute was not substantially
overbroad. 09 The Court reasoned that the legitimate reach of the statute
outweighed the tiny fraction of potentially impermissible applications.' 110
The tiny fraction may consist of pictures contained in medical textbooks or
National Geographic magazines."'I The Court stated that this small poten-
tial for overbreadth would be better cured through a case-by-case analysis,
rather than a finding that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad.'l 2
D. THE SUPREME COURT PROHIBITS THE MERE POSSESSION OF
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
Protection for victims of child pornography was further extended in
Osborne v. Ohio.113 Osborne was convicted of violating a statute that
102. Id. at 766 (referring to the 1977 New York Penal Law, Article 263, § 263.15).
103. Id. at 768-69.
104. Id. at 768.
105. Id. at 771 (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 630 (1973)).
106. Id. at 769.
107. Id. at 770 (citing CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 580-81 (1973)) (noting the
Court's reluctance to strike down a statute that "covers a whole range of easily identifiable and
constitutionally proscribable ... conduct").




112. Id. at 773-74.
113. 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
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prohibited the mere possession of child pornography. 14 Specifically, he
was convicted for possessing four pictures of a nude male adolescent in
sexually explicit positions."l5 In Osborne, the Supreme Court upheld the
conviction and ruled that a state's interest in protecting the well-being of
children used in the production of child pornography justified the ban on
possession of those materials produced with actual children.116
The Court noted that since Ferber, much of the market for child
pornography had gone underground, making it nearly impossible to stop the
harm done to children by only attacking the distribution and production of
child pornography."17 The Court remarked that because child pornography
creates a permanent record of a child's abuse, its existence continues to
haunt the child.118 Furthermore, encouraging the destruction of the material
is helpful because pedophiles use the material to seduce other children into
participating in the production of child pornography."19 Based on these
facts, the Court secured its holding in the gravity of the state's interest of
protecting children harmed in the production of child pornography.120 In
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court found that the state's interest
in protecting children harmed in the production of pornography was not
furthered by banning virtual child pornography.121
III. ANALYSIS
In Free Speech Coalition, Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion of the
Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. 122
The majority held that §§ 2256(8)(B) and (D) of the CPPA were overbroad
and unconstitutional. 23 Justice Thomas concurred with the judgment.124
Justice O'Connor concurred in part and dissented in part; Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined in her dissent.125  Chief Justice
Rehnquist filed a separate dissenting opinion, in which Justice Scalia
joined, except for the discussion on legislative history.126
114. Osborne, 495 U.S. at 107.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 110.
117. Id. at 110-11.
118. Id. at 111 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1403 (2002).
122. Id. at 1395-96.
123. Id. at 1406; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000).
124. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1406 (Thomas, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 1407 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
126. Id. at 1411 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The Court was faced with deciding whether certain subsections of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 violated the First Amendment's
protection of freedom of speech.127 The CPPA prohibited sexually explicit
images that appear to be minors, regardless of whether real children were
used in their production.128 The Court found that because the CPPA banned
images that were made without using actual children, it prohibited speech
beyond that proscribed by New York v. Ferber.129 Furthermore, the Court
found that the CPPA did not regulate obscene speech and made no attempt
to conform to the obscenity standards created in Miller.130 The Court
concluded that the main issue was whether the CPPA was constitutional
when it prohibited speech that was neither legally obscene under Miller nor
child pornography under Ferber. 131
1. Speech Prohibited by the CPPA
The CPPA prohibits child pornography, as defined in Ferber, and three
other categories of speech.132 The Free Speech Coalition challenged two of
the new categories, § 2256(8)(B) and § 2256(8)(D).133 Section 2256(8)(B)
prohibits what is commonly called "virtual child pornography."134 Section
2256(8)(B) proscribes "any visual depiction ... [that] is, or appears to be,
of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."' 35 The Court noted that
the prohibition on "any visual depiction" extended to all images without
regard to how they were produced.136 The Court postulated that the statute
could go so far as to prohibit a Renaissance painting that appeared to be of a
127. Id. at 1396.
128. Id.; Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (2000).
129. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1396 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747,
764 (1982)).
130. Id. The Court noted that Congress prohibited obscene material in a separate statute, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1460-1466 (2000). Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1397. The three other categories of speech include images commonly referred to
as virtual child pornography; computer morphing, a lower tech version of virtual child
pornography; and any "sexually explicit images pandered as child pornography." Id.
133. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D).
134. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1397. The third new category of speech banned by
§ 2256(8)(C) of the CPPA was computer morphing. Id. The morphed images are created by alter-
ing innocent pictures of actual children so it appears the children are engaged in sexual activity.
Id. The Free Speech Coalition did not challenge this provision, so the Court did not consider it.
Id. However the Court did explain that the morphed images "implicate the interests of real
children" making them closer to the images banned in Ferber. Id.
135. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B).
136. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1397.
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minor engaged in sexual conduct or a movie filmed with youthful looking
adult actors. 137
Additionally, the Court noted that the production of these and other
prohibited images did not harm, or even involve, actual children.138 Con-
gress found that virtual child pornography threatens children in less direct
ways. 139 The Court stated that the harm done to actual children, arising
from virtual child pornography, is caused by the content of the images, not
the manner of production.140
The Free Speech Coalition also challenged § 2256(8)(D), which ex-
tended the definition of child pornography to include any sexually explicit
image "that was 'advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed
in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains
a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."" 4'
The Court stated that although the provision was intended to prohibit im-
ages intentionally pandered as child pornography, the actual reach of the
provision was much greater.142 The Court further explained that "[o]nce a
work has been described as child pornography, the taint remains on the
speech in the hands of subsequent possessors, making possession unlawful
even though the content otherwise would not be objectionable."
43
Considering the speech at issue, the Court stated that the First Amend-
ment prevents the government from controlling what people "see or read or
speak or hear."144 However, this freedom of speech is limited and does not
encompass all categories of speech, including "defamation, incitement, ob-
scenity, and pornography produced with real children."145 The Court found
that the speech prohibited by the CPPA was not included in any of these
categories.146 The Court would have had to establish virtual child por-
nography as a new category of unprotected speech before the CPPA could
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.; see supra notes 4-9 and accompanying text.
140. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1397.
141. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000)).
142. Id. at 1397-98 (citing S. REP. No. 104-358, at 22 (1996)). This provision prevented
child pornographers and pedophiles from exploiting prurient interests in child sexuality and sexual
activity through the production or distribution of pornographic material that is intentionally
pandered as child pornography. S. REP. No. 104-358, at 22 (1996).
143. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1398.





pass constitutional standards.147 Justice Kennedy noted that the Court was
unwilling to take this step.148
2. The CPPA Is Inconsistent With Miller
The CPPA prohibits images without regard to the obscenity require-
ments contained in Miller. 149 The Miller standard requires that the work
appeal to the prurient interest.150 The CPPA proscribed any image of child
sexual activity regardless of whether the work appeals to the prurient
interest.15 , The Court stated that the CPPA would prohibit pictures in a
psychology manual, documentary, or movie describing the trauma of sexual
abuse.152 The CPPA also did not include the Miller requirement that the
work be patently offensive.153 The Court noted that although images of
what would appear to be teenagers engaged in sexual conduct may offend
some community standards, they would not in every case. 154
Finally, Miller required that the work in question lack serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 155 The CPPA prohibited speech in
spite of its potential value.156 The Court stated that the CPPA prohibited
"the visual depiction of an idea, that of teenagers engaging in sexual
activity, that is a fact of modem society and has been a theme in art and
literature throughout the ages."t57 The Court noted that both William
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet and modem movies have involved scenes
and themes that could potentially fall under the prohibitions of the CPPA. 158
147. Id.
148. Jd.
149. Id. (citing Miller v. California 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
150. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
151. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1400 (2002).
152. Id.
153. Id. (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 24).
154. Id. The Court noted that the CPPA prohibited images of persons that appear to be under
the age of eighteen; even though the legal age for marriage is below eighteen in many states. Id.
155. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
156. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1400.
157. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has noted that it is a fundamental principle of the
First Amendment that "the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414
(1989).
158. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1400. The Court noted that the movie Traffic, a
film that received an Academy Award nomination for Best Picture in 2001, portrays a sixteen-
year-old drug addict who trades sex for drugs. Id. Also, American Beauty, a movie that won the
Oscar for Best Picture in 2000, contains images of teenagers engaging in sexual relations. Id. The
movie also involves a teenage girl who becomes sexually involved with a middle-aged man and "a
scene where, although the movie audience understands the act is not taking place, one character
believes he is watching a teenage boy performing a sexual act on an older man." Id.
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The Court reasoned that possessors of such works would suffer severe
punishment without an inquiry into whether the material had redeeming
value.159 The Court stated that Miller protected against this by requiring
that the work be considered as a whole.160 The CPPA did not offer the
same protection.' 6' Furthermore, the Court noted that "an essential First
Amendment rule" is that a work cannot be judged by the existence of a
single scene. 162 The Court concluded that the CPPA did not prohibit
obscenity because it failed to require a link between what was prohibited
and an affront to community standards as was required by the definition of
obscenity in Miller.1
63
3. The CPPA Is Not Supported by Ferber
Alternatively, the government argued that the CPPA prohibited speech
that is virtually indistinguishable from child pornography.164 The govern-
ment reasoned that because Ferber allowed prohibiting child pornography
without regard to its value, virtual child pornography should also be pro-
hibited.165 Ferber prohibited child pornography to prevent the harm done
to the actual children involved in the production of the images. 66 The
CPPA prohibited speech that does not harm actual children during its
production.167 The government argued that the virtual images could lead to
actual cases of child abuse.168 The Court dismissed this argument and
concluded that these harms were contingent and indirect. 69 Furthermore,
the Court stated "harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but
depends upon some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts."
70
The government also argued that the indirect harms were adequate be-
cause Ferber found child pornography had little, if any, value.' 7 ' The Court
159. Id. at 1401. The CPPA allowed for imprisonment of a first offender for up to fifteen
years. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(b)(1) (2000).
160. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1401; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
161. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1401.
162. Id. (citing A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Att'y
Gen. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)).
163. Id.; Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
164. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1401 (discussing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 761 1982)).
165. Id.
166. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982); see also supra notes 89-101 and
accompanying text.
167. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1402 (2002).
168. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
169. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1402.
170. Id.
171. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 762).
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found this argument failed for two reasons. 172 First., Ferber confirmed that
speech had to be a product of child sexual abuse before it falls outside the
protections of the First Amendment.173 The Court stated that Ferber was
concerned with the harm caused to children during the production of the
materials, not with what the speech communicated.174 The second problem
with the government's argument was that Ferber did not find child
pornography valueless.175 The Court noted that Ferber found a youthful
looking adult or other simulation could be used to create images that would
otherwise be prohibited.176 The Court reasoned that Ferber could not
support the statute because it relied on the very distinction the CPPA sought
to eliminate. 1
77
4. The Government's Justifications Were Not Supported by Law
The government argued that the CPPA was necessary because it keeps
virtual child pornography away from pedophiles that can use it to seduce
children.178 The Court reasoned that although the government could
penalize adults who give unsuitable material to children, it could not reduce
speech for adults to that suitable for children.179 The CPPA's ban on
speech encompassed a significant amount of speech that would be legal in
the hands of law-abiding adults.1SO The Court reasoned that the government
could not ban speech "simply because it may fall into the hands of
children."18I The Court found that the evil the government was trying to
prevent depended on the illegal acts of a third party, and did not necessarily
flow from the speech itself.182 The Court stated that protecting children
from criminal acts was a legitimate objective, but the ban on virtual child
pornography was not narrowly tailored to meet this objective. 183
The government also suggested that the banned speech "whets the ap-
petites of pedophiles and encourages them to engage in illegal conduct." 8 4
172. Id.
173. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764-65).
174. Id.
175. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761).
176. Id. (citing Ferber, 458 U.S. at 763).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968); Butler v. Michigan, 352
U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
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The Court noted that the government could not constitutionally attempt to
control the private thoughts of its citizens.185 Furthermore, the government
was unable to show that child abuse occurs because pedophiles view virtual
child pornography.186 The Court noted that the First Amendment requires
more than banning speech because it may, at some point in the future,
encourage an unlawful act. 187 The speech must incite "imminent lawless
action," and the action must be likely to occur.188 The Court concluded that
the government had to prove a "significantly stronger, more direct
connection," before speech could be prohibited because it may encourage
illegal activity.189
The government next argued that virtual child pornography promotes
the market for real child pornography because the images are indistin-
guishable, part of the same market, and often exchanged together. 190 There-
fore, the government argued, virtual images encourage trafficking of images
created with real children.191 The Court found this argument implausible
because no one would risk using real children if a legal alternative,
computerized images, would achieve the same goal.
192
Finally, the government argued that virtual images make it nearly
impossible to prosecute pornographers that use actual children. 193 Accord-
ing to the government, experts struggle to determine whether the images
were made with real children or by computer imaging.194 The Court
reasoned that this is the reverse of what the First Amendment requires
because it necessitates a ban on protected speech in order to ban unpro-
tected speech.1 95 The First Amendment requires the opposite-a certain
amount of unprotected speech may go unpunished in order to protect the
lawful expression of others. 196
The government argued that the challenged provisions of the CPPA did
not suppress speech, but merely shifted the burden to the defendant to prove
185. Id. (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 566 (1969)). The Court stated, "The right
to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because
speech is the beginning of thought." Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. (citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam)).
188. Id. (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1403-04.





196. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)).
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that the speech was lawful. 197 The CPPA included an affirmative defense,
which allowed an accused to evade conviction by proying that the material
was created with adults and did not otherwise convey the impression that
the images were of actual children.198 The defense was only available for
distributors or producers of the work; it did not apply to those who simply
possess the material.199
The Court stated that this defense raised "serious constitutional
difficulties" because it required that a defendant prove that his speech was
lawful. 200 The stakes are high, the affirmative defense applies only after
prosecution has begun, and failure of the defense results in a felony
conviction. 201 The Court noted that if it is nearly impossible for the
government to prove how the material is made, it would be equally, if not
more difficult, for the "innocent possessor."
202
The Court noted that the affirmative defense could not save the statute
because it was incomplete for a number of reasons. 203 First, the defense
only applied to distributors or producers, not to those who merely possess
the material.2 04 Second, the defense was only available for those who pro-
duce materials with youthful looking adult actors.205 It was not available to
those who produce material, without using actual children, through other
methods, such as computer imaging.20 6 This was not tied to the govern-
ment's interest of distinguishing between real and virtual images, leaving a
substantial amount of speech unprotected.2 07 The Court concluded that §
2256(8)(B) banned material beyond either child pornography or obscenity
and the government's justifications were not supported by precedent or the
First Amendment.2 08 Furthermore it prohibited a substantial amount of
lawful speech and was therefore unconstitutionally overbroad. 209
197. Id.
198. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (2000)).
199. Id. at 1404-05.
200. Id. at 1404.
201. Id.
202. Id. The Court went on to explain the unreasonably high evidentiary burden placed on
the defendant and stated, "Where the defendant is not the producer of the work, he may have no
way of establishing the identity, or even the existence, of the actors." Id.
203. Id. at 1405.
204. Id. The Court stated that "while the affirmative defense may protect a movie producer
from prosecution for the act of distribution, that same producer, and all other persons in the




208. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
209. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1405 (2002).
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5. Section 2256(8)(D) Is Unconstitutionally Overbroad
Subsection D barred advertising or promoting sexually explicit material
that suggested children were involved. 210 The Court stated that a movie
which does not contain child pornography would be prohibited if the title or
trailer conveys the impression that sexually explicit scenes of minors are in-
cluded.21l The decision depends on how the speech is offered, according to
the Court, not on what is portrayed.2 12 The Court noted that Congress was
silent on the harm arising from lawful images pandered as child
pornography.
2 3
Although pandering may be a relevant consideration, subsection D
went beyond commercial exploitation.2 14 The CPPA prohibited possession
of material that may have been pandered as child pornography earlier in the
distribution chain unbeknownst to an innocent possessor.21 5 The Court
noted that possession would become illegal even if the possessor knew the
material was mislabeled.2 16 In essence, it would punish someone for pos-
sessing child pornography that was not in fact child pornography.2 17 The
First Amendment requires a more narrow constraint.2 1 8 The Court con-
cluded that the government did not offer a serious defense of this section
and ruled that it was overbroad and therefore unconstitutional. 21 9
B. JUSTICE THOMAS' CONCURRENCE
Justice Thomas was most persuaded by the government's assertion that
those in possession of child pornography created with actual children could
escape conviction by merely claiming that the images were computer-
generated. 220 However, he noted that the government was unable to prove
that a defendant had actually been acquitted by this "computer-generated
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D).
211. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1405.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1405-06 (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966)). The Ginz-
burg Court found that the context in which materials were promoted could be a relevant consider-
ation as to whether material satisfied the obscenity test. Ginzburg, 383 U.S. at 474. The Court
explained that conduct which "deliberately emphasized the sexually provocative aspects of the
work, in order to catch the salaciously disposed" would lose protection under the First Amend-
ment. Id. at 472; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D).




219. Id. at 1405-06.
220. Id. at 1406 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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images defense." 221 Justice Thomas stated that this speculation could not
support the CPPA.222 He did suggest that if technological advances made it
impossible to enforce actual child pornography laws, the government might
have a compelling interest in regulating a narrowly defined category of law-
ful speech. 223 Justice Thomas concluded that it would be possible for the
government to narrowly tailor a statute prohibiting virtual child
pornography. 224
C. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S CONCURRENCE IN PART AND DISSENT IN
PART
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's conclusion that the CPPA
was overbroad on its ban of pornography created with youthful looking
adults.225 She disagreed with the Court's finding that the ban on virtual
child pornography was also overbroad.226 Justice O'Connor suggested that
the striking of "appears to be" language from the statute should only apply
to youthful adult pornography. 227
1. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that Ferber did not support the
CPPA because the Act sought to regulate images that were created without
harming actual children. 228 The government was unable to prove a strong
enough link between virtual images and actual child abuse that justified
creating a new category of unprotected speech. 229
Justice O'Connor declared that the Court correctly struck down the lan-
guage "conveys the impression" in § 2256(8)(D)'s regulation of advertising
and promotion of materials.2 30 She noted that the government failed to
show how this ban on images conveying the impression that they contain
child pornography served a compelling state interest.231 Justice O'Connor
further noted that the Court correctly concluded that the provision was
overbroad and not narrowly tailored. 232 Finally, Justice O'Connor agreed
221. Id.
222. Id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (2000).
223. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1406-07 (2002).
224. Id. at 1407.
225. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1408 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759 (1982)).
229. Id.
230. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(D) (2000).
231. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1408 (2002).
232. Id.
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that the ban on youthful adult pornography was overbroad.233 She relied on
the majority's reasoning that many of the most popular movies and serious
literary works would be prohibited by the CPPA's language "appears to
be... of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 34
2. Justice O'Connor's Dissent, Joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Court's finding that the CPPA's
ban on virtual child pornography was overbroad. 235 She determined that the
ban on virtual child pornography could pass strict scrutiny and was not
unconstitutionally vague.236 Justice O'Connor stated that the government's
compelling interest in protecting the health and well-being of children is
well settled.237 She noted Congressional findings that stated virtual images
are used to "whet the appetites" of pedophiles, seduce children, and allow
defendants to evade conviction by claiming the images are computer-
generated. 238 Justice O'Connor found that the government's interest of
banning virtual child pornography was promoted by an effort to stop this
harm from occurring.239 Furthermore, the government does not have to
wait until harm has occurred before it can create legislation to prevent it.240
Justice O'Connor disagreed with the Free Speech Coalition's argument
that the language "appears to be... of a minor" was not narrowly tailored
to meet the government's interest of protecting children. 24' Justice
O'Connor would have narrowly interpreted "appears to be" to read
"virtually indistinguishable from."242 She concluded that this interpretation
would have cured any constitutional claim of overbreadth or lack of narrow
tailoring. 243 The narrow interpretation would also alleviate any concern that
the language was vague. 244 Finally, Justice O'Connor found that the Free
233. Id.
234. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982) (citing cases in support of
protecting the health and well-being of children)).
238. Id. at 1408-09.
239. Id.




244. Id. Justice O'Connor noted that "[tihis Court has never required 'mathematical certain-
ty' or 'meticulous specificity' from the language of a statute." See id. (citing Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (holding that a city's anti-noise ordinance prohibiting deliber-
ate noisy activity that disrupted school activity was not unconstitutionally vague)).
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Speech Coalition was unable to prove that the CPPA prohibited a
substantial amount of protected speech. 245 Therefore, Justice O'Connor
stated, the Court was incorrect in concluding that the statute was
overbroad. 246
Justice O'Connor would have rectified the constitutional concerns of
the CPPA by striking the "appears to be" provision as it applied to youthful
adult pornography and the "conveys the impression" language of the
advertising and promotion provision.247 However, she would have kept the
"appears to be" language as it applied to computer-generated child
pornography. 248
D. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S DISSENT IN WHICH JUSTICE SCALIA
JOINED IN PART
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the government had a compelling interest in protecting chil-
dren from the harm of sexual abuse, and that technological advances will
soon make it nearly impossible for the government to protect children from
sexual abuse.249 The Chief Justice found that the CPPA could have been
limited to only reach what was previously unprotected speech.250 Although
the Court and Justice O'Connor read the statute to include images of
"youthful looking adult actors engaged in suggestive sexual activity"
because it contains the word "simulated," the Chief Justice would not have
gone so far.2 51 The CPPA's definition of sexually explicit conduct only
included the "hard core of child pornography," which the Court found
unprotected in Ferber.252 According to the Chief Justice, the CPPA would
only ban actual sexual activity between youthful looking adult actors, not
mere suggestions of sexual activity.2 53
245. Id. at 1410.
246. Id. at 1409-10.
247. Id. at 1411 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B), (D) (2000)).
248. Id.
249. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
250. Id.
251. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8).
252. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1411 (2002) (citing New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982)). The Chief Justice noted that the CPPA defines sexually
explicit conduct as follows: "Actual or simulated.., sexual intercourse, including genital-genital,
oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; ...
bestiality; ... masturbation; ... sadistic or masochistic abuse; ... or lascivious exhibition of the
genitals or pubic area of any person." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)-(E) (2000)).
253. Id. The Chief Justice stated that "suggestions of sexual activity, such as youthful look-
ing adult actors squirming under a blanket" are more like written descriptions of sexual activity,
and fall outside the reach of the statute. Id.
2003]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that Congress intended for
the CPPA to only reach those computer-generated images that are easily
mistaken for pictures of actual children engaging in sexual conduct. 254 The
CPPA proscribed images that are virtually indistinguishable from pictures
of actual children, not depictions of Shakespearian tragedies, as the majority
purported.255
In addition, the Chief Justice noted that actual movie producers never
felt the chill of protected speech that the majority claimed would occur from
the CPPA.256 The CPPA was enacted in 1996, the movies the majority
mentioned as potentially violating it won Academy awards in 2000 and
2001.257
Finally, the CPPA's prohibition on advertising and promoting did not
reach any further than the "sordid business of pandering" that was already
unprotected by the First Amendment. 258 The Court read this provision too
broadly, according to the Chief Justice, because it would not reach a person
who possesses protected materials. 259 The provision could be constitu-
tionally limited by requiring that a possessor know the material contains
images of real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct or virtually
indistinguishable computer-generated images.260
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded by stating that the CPPA constitu-
tionally extended the definition of child pornography to include computer-
generated images that are virtually indistinguishable from images of actual
children.261 Furthermore, although unacceptable applications of the CPPA
might occur, the Chief Justice did not believe they would be substantial
compared to the "legitimate sweep." 262
IV. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's decision in Free Speech Coalition attracted a
great deal of attention.263 Supporters of civil rights commended the ruling,
254. Id. at 1412. Justice Scalia did not join the paragraph of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
dissent that discussed the statute's legislative history. Id. at n.2.
255. Id. at 1412.
256. Id. at 1412-13.
257. See id. (referring to the movies American Beauty and Traffic); see also supra note 158
and accompanying text.
258. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1413 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 1413-14.
261. Id. at 1414.
262. Id. (citing Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
263. Stephen V. Treglia, Lawyers and Technology After 'Ashcroft,' Is Virtual Child Porn A
Crime, 228 N.Y. L. J. 5, 5 (Sept. 17, 2002).
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while the Attorney General promised to advocate for a constitutional
alternative. 264
A. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES
In response to the Court's decision, Congress drafted bills to remedy
the constitutional defects of the CPPA.265 In light of the Supreme Court's
decision, a new bill regulating virtual child pornography will have to more
closely resemble the Miller obscenity test before it will pass constitutional
muster. 266 Adding a condition that the work must lack serious literary,
artistic, scientific, or political value may bring new legislation safely under
the umbrella of First Amendment jurisprudence. 267 Even if proposed
legislation does not completely comply with the Miller test by not requiring
that the work appeal to the prurient interest, the Court may allow for a slight
modification in the obscenity test because the health and safety of children
is at issue.268 Although changing the bill to include a requirement that the
material meet legal obscenity guidelines will satisfy the Constitution, it may
create procedural and substantive difficulties.269
B. PROSECUTORIAL CHALLENGES
Since the Supreme Court found portions of the CPPA unconstitutional,
prosecutors have faced new challenges in proving cases against potential
child pornographers. 270 Less than a month after the Supreme Court's deci-
sion, an Illinois man charged with possession of child pornography filed a
motion to dismiss the case against him based. on the Court's ruling.27'
264. Joan Biskupic, Supreme Court Ends Ban on Virtual Child Porn, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,
2002, at 3A.
265. Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2002, S. 2520, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 4623, 107th Cong. (2002).
266. Stopping Child Pornography: Hearing on S. 2520 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Frederick Schauer, Professor, John F. Kennedy School of
Government and Harvard Law School), available at LEXIS, Federal Document Clearing House
Congressional Testimony.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 643 (1968)).
269. See id. (noting that proving a work is obscene beyond a reasonable doubt is a daunting
task).
270. E.g., Tony Gordon, Round Lake Beach Man Tests High Court's Virtual Porn Ruling,
CHI. DAILY HERALD, May 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 20844639.
271. Id. The defendant contended that the state statute he was charged under contained lan-
guage identical to the language found unconstitutional in Free Speech Coalition. Id. Therefore,
the defendant argued, the state must prove actual children were depicted in the images taken from
his computer. Id.
2003]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Constitutional challenges to state laws governing child pornography have
allowed at least three defendants to walk free. 272
In Virginia, a man accused of possessing thousands of images of virtual
child pornography asked the judge to allow him to withdraw his guilty
plea.273 Some of the images confiscated from the man's home were of
infants, but the question remains as to whether they were real children.274
The prosecutors have the heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that the images depicted actual children.275
Another challenge faced by prosecutors is the individual review of
every pornographic image involving children to determine if the image is of
an identifiable child or if it is virtual, and therefore, non-actionable. 276 In
Cook County, Illinois, the state's attorney found around 250,000 images of
potential child pornography in one man's home.277 If the investigators were
forced to review each picture individually, spending one second on each
image, it would take close to seventy-two hours. 278
Fortunately, the investigators have the resources available to run the
pictures through a computer with a massive database of published porno-
graphic images. 279 The investigators will know they have a picture of an
actual child if an image matches a picture in the database that was created
before computers were able to generate virtually indistinguishable
images. 280 The computer database solves the problem for those prosecutors
that have access to the system, but for those who do not, the task could be
overwhelming.
C. NORTH DAKOTA
The Supreme Court's decision to strike two provisions of the CPPA
does not invalidate North Dakota's statutes regulating child pornography. 28'
The state's child pornography laws do not specifically mention virtual child
pornography, nor do they include the language "appears to be" or "conveys
272. Tony Gordon, Judge Again Throws Out Porn Charges, CHI. DAILY HERALD, July 20,
2002, available at 2002 WL 23520215.
273. Tad Dickens, Guilty Plea in Child Porn Case May be Altered; Man Asks Roanoke
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the impression" that was so troublesome to the Court in Free Speech
Coalition.282  Furthermore, the North Dakota Legislature did not
contemplate computer-generated pornography when it enacted the child
pornography laws.283
Although North Dakota law does not currently regulate virtual images
of child pornography, the CPPA has impacted the ability of North Dakota
prosecutors to pursue child pornographers. 284 According to North Dakota
Congressman Earl Pomeroy, United States Attorneys have had to suspend
the prosecution of child pornography cases because they no longer had a
legal action after the Free Speech Coalition decision.285 As technology ad-
vances, so will the challenges that face judges and lawyers "who must meld




In Free Speech Coalition, the Supreme Court ruled that two provisions
of the CPPA were unconstitutional. 28 7 The Court found the language of the
statute prohibited a large amount of lawful speech, such as mainstream
movies and Renaissance paintings. 288 The Court found that the CPPA
proscribed a universe of speech outside of constitutionally unprotected
obscenity and child pornography produced with actual children. 289 The
Court held that §§ 2256(8)(B) and 2256(8)(D) of the CPPA were
unconstitutionally overbroad. 290
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